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98 N.C. L. REV. 689 (2020) 
Let’s Talk Specifics: Why STI Evidence Should Be Treated as a 
“Specific Instance” Under Rape Shield Laws* 
The federal government and individual states have enacted rape shield laws in 
response to concerns that victims of sexual violence were underreporting and 
experiencing undue humiliation at trial. Designed to bar evidence related to the 
alleged victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition, rape shield laws 
prevent defendants from offering evidence regarding the victim’s sexual conduct 
unless it falls within three exceptions. One of these exceptions to the general 
inadmissibility of sexual behavior evidence––the “specific instance” exception—
allows a court to admit “specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered 
to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, 
or other physical evidence.” 
This Recent Development argues evidence of sexually transmitted infections 
(“STIs”) constitutes a “specific instance” under rape shield laws. To minimize 
the retraumatization many victims experience when their sexual past is put forth 
at trial, the justice system has overcorrected at the expense of defendants’ rights. 
Admitting STI evidence would both protect defendants’ constitutional rights and 
comport with the purpose of rape shield laws. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 2017, more than eighty women have accused film producer Harvey 
Weinstein of rape, sexual assault, and sexual abuse that occurred over a period 
of at least thirty years.1 In 2018, during Supreme Court Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh’s Senate confirmation process, Dr. Christine Blasey Ford accused 
him of sexually assaulting her while they were teenagers in high school.2 Since 
then, female college classmates of Justice Kavanaugh’s have come forward with 
similar accusations from their time at Yale.3 Then, in 2019, prosecutors charged 
 
 *  © 2020 Erin Wilson. 
 1. See Brooks Barnes & Jan Ransom, Harvey Weinstein Is Said To Reach $44 Million Deal To Settle 
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/business/harvey-
weinstein-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/AB7Q-8J7P (dark archive)]. 
 2. See Ronan Farrow & Jane Meyer, A Sexual-Misconduct Allegation Against the Supreme Court 




 3. Sandra E. Garcia, Calls for Kavanaugh’s Impeachment Come amid New Misconduct Allegations, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/us/brett-kavanaugh-allegations-
trump-impeach.html [https://perma.cc/Y8FN-X6AR (dark archive)] (describing another recent 
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financier Jeffrey Epstein with sex trafficking, and multiple women accused him 
of rape.4 These three recent and notorious examples of sexual violence follow 
the emergence of the #MeToo movement, a national outcry for greater 
protections and more recognition for victims of sexual abuse and assault.5 Even 
earlier, in 1994, Congress recognized the need for reform in its treatment of 
such allegations with the passage of Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act, the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”).6 This 
legislation sought to better recognize and support victims of domestic and 
sexual violence while maintaining the rights of criminal defendants.7 
Protecting the privacy interests of victims of sexual assault against 
humiliation of past sexual activity is important. In the context of the criminal 
process, testifying in open court—much less coming forward with an 
allegation—is incredibly daunting and carries the risk of embarrassment, at best, 
and retraumatization, at worst.8 However, protecting the constitutional rights 
 
allegation of an instance of the Justice’s sexual misconduct against a Yale classmate during his college 
years). 
 4. See Jane Coaston, Anna North & Andrew Prokop, Jeffrey Epstein, the Convicted Sex Offender 
Who Was Friends with Donald Trump and Bill Clinton, Explained, VOX (Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/12/3/18116351/jeffrey-epstein-case-indictment-arrested-trump-clinton 
[https://perma.cc/MV3W-7ED9]. 
 5. See About, METOO., https://metoomvmt.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/B5WZ-3XCU] (“The 
‘me too.’ movement was founded in 2006 to help survivors of sexual violence, particularly Black women 
and girls, and other young women of color from low wealth communities, find pathways to healing. . . . 
What started as local grassroots work has expanded to reach a global community of survivors from all 
walks of life and helped to de-stigmatize the act of surviving by highlighting the breadth and impact 
of a sexual violence worldwide.”); see also Alia E. Dastagir, It’s Been Two Years Since The #MeToo 
Movement Exploded. Now What?, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2019/09/30/me-too-movement-women-sexual-assault-harvey-weinstein-brett-
kavanaugh/1966463001/ [https://perma.cc/PGC4-8E2F] (providing an overview of the explosive 
growth of the “#MeToo” movement from 2017–19). 
 6. See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (“In addressing the subject of sexual 
assault, domestic violence, and other criminal and unlawful acts that particularly affect women . . . .”); 
ACLU Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee Regarding the Violence Against Women Act of 2005, S. 1197, 
AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-letter-senate-judiciary-committee-regarding-
violence-against-women-act-2005-s-1197 [https://perma.cc/82R7-XR5N] (stating VAWA has been 
regarded as “one of the most effective pieces of legislation enacted to end domestic violence, dating 
violence, sexual assault, and stalking”). 
 7. See History of VAWA, LEGAL MOMENTUM, https://www.legalmomentum.org/history-vawa 
[https://perma.cc/66HX-7TW2] (“In recognition of the severity of the crimes associated with domestic 
violence, sexual assault and stalking, Congress passed . . . [VAWA,] marking the first comprehensive 
federal legislative package designed to end violence against women.”). 
 8. See K. Alexis Johnson, Military Rule of Evidence 412: Can Too Much Balancing Tip the Scales of 
Justice?, 9 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 145, 146 (2014) (“Embarrassment and humiliation usually come in the 
form of cross-examination during a criminal proceeding for charges of sexual assault.”). A major 
distinction between Military Rule of Evidence 412 and Federal Rule of Evidence 412 is that the 
military version of the rule maintained a balancing test despite Congress eliminating it from the federal 
criminal evidentiary rule. See Shane R. Reeves, Time To Fine-Tune Military Rule of Evidence 412, 196 
MIL. L. REV. 47, 64 n.102 (2008) (noting that the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice 
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of defendants “must not be overlooked in the interest of shielding the privacy 
interests of victims.”9 In these cases, courts should not forget a defendant’s 
constitutional rights—the right to a fair trial, the right to confront the witnesses 
against him, and the right to present evidence in his defense.10 Despite the 
upsetting nature of the alleged crime, these rights remain vital.  
Prior to 1978, “[i]f a defendant in a rape case raise[d] the defense of 
consent, that defendant [could] then offer evidence about the victim’s prior 
sexual behavior.”11 Courts viewed prior sexual activity as “probative of 
consent”12 on the theory “that a woman who had consented to sex once possessed 
a ‘character for unchastity’ and thus was more likely to have consented to sex 
on the occasion in question.”13 The general view was also that consent was 
“transferable to other parties.”14 If a woman consented to sex with one man, “she 
was considered to have functionally consented to sex with others.”15 This 
opened the door to a slew of probing questions for the victim, including 
“whether she had had intercourse before, how many times, how old she was 
when she had intercourse for the first time, and with how many men.”16 This 
method applied even if the victim and the defendant did not know each other 
before the alleged conduct.17 Because of this invasive questioning, “not only was 
the defendant on trial, but the victim was placed on trial, too.”18 Historically, 
this burden fell on women because victims of sexual violence are 
overwhelmingly female, although men can be victims of sexual violence as 
well.19  
 
Working Group chose to keep the balancing test in the military version of the Rule since “[t]here 
seem[ed] to be no good reason to delete it”). 
 9. Johnson, supra note 8, at 146–47. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. 
 11. 124 CONG. REC. 34,912 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). 
 12. I. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 836 (2013). 
 13. Id. (citing 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 924–924a, at 458–60 (3d ed. 1940)); see also People 
v. Johnson, 39 P. 622, 623 (Cal. 1895) (“This class of evidence is admissible for the purpose of tending 
to show the nonprobability of resistance upon the part of the prosecutrix; for it is certainly more 
probable that a woman who has done these things voluntarily in the past would be much more likely 
to consent than one whose past reputation was without blemish, and whose personal conduct could not 
truthfully be assailed.”). 
 14. Michelle G. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a 
New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 54 (2002). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Capers, supra note 12, at 837. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Johnson, supra note 8, at 149. 
 19. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE 
PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY (NISVS): 2010–2012 STATE REPORT 17–18 (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/NISVS-StateReportBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/76XC-
QSC6]. Thus, I use female pronouns for simplicity throughout this piece. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 689 (2020) 
692 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
The rule’s harsh treatment of victims caused victims’ rights advocates to 
question the propriety of a rule that allowed such expansive probing into a 
victim’s past behavior.20 Some scholars echoed this concern, arguing that the 
victim, not the defendant, was put on trial through the use of such inflammatory 
evidence.21 This ultimately led Congress to enact Federal Rule of Evidence 
41222 in 1978.23 
Rule 412, the federal rape shield law, aims to “remedy stereotypical 
thinking in the fact finding process.”24 In contrast with the historical view that 
prior sexual activity was probative of consent, “Rule 412’s rationale is that a 
woman’s sexual history is not a good predictor of her present behavior.”25 The 
current version of Rule 412 prohibits, in civil and criminal proceedings, 
“evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior . . . 
or . . . to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.”26 
Congress still sought to ensure that the interests of the rape victim, the 
defendant, and society were all “fairly balance[d].”27 Rule 412(b) was an attempt 
to balance these interests by allowing evidence of specific prior sexual acts to be 
admitted in certain restricted circumstances in criminal cases.28 There are three 
such circumstances in which a court can admit evidence of specific instances of 
a rape victim’s sexual conduct. The first circumstance is when the Constitution 
requires the evidence be admitted, because to deny admissibility would deny 
the defendant a constitutional right.29 The second circumstance is when the 
defendant raises the issue of consent, and the evidence is of sexual behavior with 
that specific defendant.30 The third circumstance, the primary focus of this 
Recent Development, is when “evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual 
 
 20. Johnson, supra note 8, at 149. 
 21. See Privacy of Rape Victims: Hearing on H.R. 14,666 and Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on 
Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 51 (1976) (statement of Rep. Harris). 
 22. FED. R. EVID. 412. Because federal criminal law has narrow jurisdiction, Kerry C. O’Dell, 
Evidence in Sexual Assault, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 819, 822 (2006), and because the Federal Rule of 
Evidence 412 was “intended to serve as a model for the states,” Nancy Cosgrove Cody, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 412: Was the Change an Improvement?, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 244, 245 (1980), this Recent 
Development uses “Rule 412” to encompass both the federal rule and state evidentiary rules that are 
modeled after the federal rule. 
 23. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046. 
 24. Jane H. Aiken, Leveling the Playing Field: Federal Rule of Evidence 412 & 415: Evidence Class as 
a Platform for Larger (More Important) Lessons, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 927, 930 (2003). 
 25. Id. 
 26. FED. R. EVID. 412(a). 
 27. 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Mann).  
 28. See Cody, supra note 22, at 245. The federal rule also provides an exception for civil cases. 
FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2). 
 29. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C). 
 30. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B) (“The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case: 
. . . evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior with respect to the person accused of 
the sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor 
. . . .”). 
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behavior [is] offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the 
source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence.”31 
Litigation under Rule 412(b) has produced a list of widely admissible 
evidence of specific instances of an alleged victim’s sexual behavior that is 
slightly more expansive than the statute’s specific exceptions. In addition to 
evidence of prior consensual relations with the defendant32 and evidence that 
the semen belongs to someone other than the defendant,33 examples of 
admissible evidence under Rule 412(b) include—in the case of a child 
complainant—evidence that explains why the child has “advanced sexual 
knowledge or a preoccupation with sex.”34 
A less addressed example of evidence related to a specific prior sexual act, 
and one seemingly left out of the language of Rule 412 altogether, is evidence 
of sexually transmitted infections.35 The question of whether STI evidence is 
admissible under Rule 412(b) has not been well addressed at the federal level,36 
and only a handful of states have tackled the question.37 The most common 
example of this type of evidence is when a defendant seeks to present evidence 
that either the alleged victim or the defendant has tested positive for an STI 
while the other party has not.38 For example, a defendant accused of rape wants 
to offer medical testimony that the defendant tested negative for chlamydia and 
the alleged victim tested positive, thereby establishing evidence showing that 
the defendant did not have sex with the alleged victim. Jurisdictions that have 
admitted STI evidence view it as exculpatory and categorically distinct from 
the types of evidence found inadmissible under Rule 412.39 On the other hand, 
several courts have reached the opposite conclusion, finding STI evidence to be 
 
 31. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A). 
 32. See United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 1991) (“When consent is the issue, 
however, Rule 412(b) permits only evidence of the defendant’s past experience with the victim.”). 
 33. This is sometimes called the “Scottsboro rebuttal.” CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, 23 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5375, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019). 
 34. O’Dell, supra note 22, at 828. 
 35. An STI is a virus or bacterial infection spread through sexual contact, whereas an STD is the 
symptomatic disease that develops as a result of an STI. STDs/STIs, AM. SEXUAL HEALTH ASS'N, 
http://www.ashasexualhealth.org/stdsstis/ [https://perma.cc/TL9J-DD9]. Subsequently, a person may 
have an infection but display no physical signs or symptoms of a disease. Id. For example, a human 
papillomavirus (“HPV”) infection can occur when there is a point of sexual contact between two people, 
but it does not become an STD until it is symptomatic. Although many courts still use the term STD, 
many public health experts prefer STI. Id. Accordingly, this Recent Development uses the more 
scientifically accurate STI throughout.  
 36. Cody, supra note 22, at 245 (“While directly affecting only a small number of rape cases where 
the alleged offense occurred within the areas of special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States or an Indian reservation, [federal] rule 412 is intended to serve as a model for those states 
that have not yet enacted rape shield legislation.”). 
 37. See infra Section I.D. 
 38. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 496–97 (Iowa 1997) (providing an example where 
the defendant wanted to offer testimony that the victim had an STI that the defendant did not have). 
 39. See infra Section II.D.  
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inadmissible under state rape shield laws.40 These courts view STI evidence as 
impermissible evidence of a complainant’s sexual behavior.41 This Recent 
Development addresses the inconsistencies among state and federal application 
of Rule 412 and the admissibility of STI evidence in sexual violence cases and 
argues that STI evidence should be treated as a specific instance under Rule 
412(b)(1) and similar state evidentiary rules.42 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces Rule 412, explains the 
purpose behind its enactment, and explores STI evidence as a specific instance. 
Part II examines the recent Supreme Court of North Carolina case, State v. 
Jacobs,43 which found that STI evidence was a specific instance under Rule 
412(b). This part argues not only that Jacobs was correctly decided but also that 
other states using similar reasoning have appropriately categorized STI 
evidence as a specific instance of sexual behavior that goes to proving more than 
propensity. Part III argues that STI evidence should be treated as a specific 
instance under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and comparable state evidentiary 
rape shield rules due to the other procedural safeguards in place to prevent 
unreliable evidence from being admitted for an improper purpose. Finally, Part 
IV rebuts specific arguments against the admissibility of STI evidence under 
Rule 412. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF RULE 412 
This part first considers the history of rape shield laws. It then analyzes 
Rule 412 by looking at the plain meaning of the statutory language, the context 
for its adoption, and subsequent judicial interpretation. 
A. History 
Reviewing the statutory history of the federal rape shield law is necessary 
to determine whether STI evidence is admissible as a specific instance under 
Rule 412(b). Prior to the enactment of rape shield laws at the federal and state 
level, alleged victims of sexual violence were often questioned about their sexual 
behavior by defense attorneys as a way to show that the alleged victims 
consented to the acts at issue or to hurt their credibility generally.44 The 
 
 40. See infra text accompanying notes 93–96. 
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 93–96. 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1) (“The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case: 
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other 
than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; (B) evidence of specific 
instances of a victim’s sexual behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if 
offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and (C) evidence whose 
exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.”). 
 43. 370 N.C. 661, 811 S.E.2d 579 (2018). 
 44. See Euphemia B. Warren, She’s Gotta Have It Now: A Qualified Rape Crisis Counselor-Victim 
Privilege, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 143–44 (1995). 
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enactment of Rule 412 and similar state evidentiary rules was a response to 
criminal justice advocates and victims’ rights groups urging legislatures to 
confront the sexism infused in the laws surrounding rape.45 
Rule 412 was “intended to serve as a model for the states.”46 The Advisory 
Committee Note to Rule 412 indicate that the rule’s general prohibition is 
intended to exclude evidence that would “contravene Rule 412’s objectives of 
shielding the alleged victim from potential embarrassment and safeguarding the 
victim against stereotypical thinking.”47 In this vein, the Advisory Committee 
Notes expressly state that “evidence such as that relating to the alleged victim’s 
mode of dress, speech, or life-style will not be admissible” unless such evidence 
qualifies for the exception in Rule 412(b)(2).48 Essentially, the rule is concerned 
with eliminating evidence that amounts to rumors “based on public behavior.”49 
The purpose of the rule is twofold: protecting the alleged victim’s privacy and 
encouraging victims to participate in the legal proceedings against alleged 
offenders.50 
Rule 412 coincided with the growing recognition of women’s equality and 
changes in public attitudes towards conventional sexual behaviors.51 This led to 
an attack on the common law treatment of rape victims at trial, which 
culminated in the passage of Rule 412 and similar state evidentiary rules.52 
B. Plain Meaning of Rule 412 
The plain meaning of Rule 412 suggests STI evidence is a specific instance 
exception. Interpretation of a statute should begin with the plain, ordinary 
 
 45. See Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law 
Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 554 (1993). 
 46. Cody, supra note 22, at 245. 
 47. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Glazier v. Fox, No. CV 2014-106, 2016 WL 827760, at *3 (D.V.I. Mar. 2, 2016) (“Evidence 
that raises concerns of stereotypical thinking or relates to an alleged victim’s mode of dress, speech, or 
lifestyle easily encompasses evidence based on public behavior.”). 
 50. FED R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment (“The rule aims to safeguard 
the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping 
that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo 
into the factfinding process. By affording victims protection in most instances, the rule also encourages 
victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged 
offenders. Rule 412 seeks to achieve these objectives by barring evidence relating to the alleged victim’s 
sexual behavior or alleged sexual predisposition, whether offered as substantive evidence or for 
impeachment, except in designated circumstances in which the probative value of the evidence 
significantly outweighs possible harm to the victim.”). 
 51. See generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975) 
(reviewing rape throughout history and common misconceptions); NANCY GAGER & CATHLEEN 
SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA (1976) (noting the increase in the 
rate of rapes caused by a society that encourages male aggression and female passivity). 
 52. See Carol DiBattiste, Federal and Military Rape Shield Rules: Are They Serving Their Purpose?, 
37 NAVAL L. REV. 123, 128–29 (1988). 
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meaning of the language used in the rule.53 Judges often turn to dictionary 
definitions to interpret the meaning of statutory language when the statute does 
not define a term itself.54 “Specific” is defined as “sharing or being those 
properties of something that allow it to be referred to a particular category” and 
“free from ambiguity.”55 A plain language reading of Rule 412 simply shows that 
evidence allowed as an exception to the general prohibition of evidence of a 
victim’s character includes evidence that refers to a particular category of 
evidence—in this case, evidence that “prove[s] that someone other than the 
defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence.”56 
Additionally, the plain meaning of a statute “may be tempered by the 
purpose of the rule.”57 Rule 412 governs the admissibility of evidence related to 
“past sexual behavior” of a victim in cases where the defendant is charged with 
a sex crime.58 The rationale underlying the prohibition is explained as protecting 
rape victims against “unwarranted invasions of privacy and harassment 
regarding their sexual conduct.”59 Although Rule 412(a) provides that evidence 
of a victim’s past sexual behavior, other than reputation or opinion evidence, is 
inadmissible, Rule 412(b) states that the court may admit “evidence of specific 
instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other 
than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical 
evidence.”60 The exceptions enumerated in Rule 412 “reflect a determination 
that, despite the general prohibition against evidence of past sexual behavior, 
certain evidence may be appropriate for the fact-finder to consider in 
ascertaining the truth and securing a just verdict in a case involving alleged sex 
crime.”61 
 
 53. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKLEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 819 (3d ed. 
2001). 
 54. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1994) (“Virtually 
every dictionary we are aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to change moderately or in minor 
fashion.”). 
 55. Specific, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/specific?src=
search-dict-hed [https://perma.cc/7V8X-8PLJ]. 
 56. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A). 
 57. State v. Chambers, No. 45608, 2019 WL 1891005, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2019). 
 58. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
 59. See State v. Ozuna, 315 P.3d 109, 114 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013); see also 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 
(1978) (statement of Rep. Mann) (noting that Federal Rule 412 was enacted “to protect rape victims 
from the degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their private lives”). 
 60. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A). Categorizing a piece of evidence as a specific instance of sexual 
behavior is a necessary, but not sufficient, part of qualifying for the exception to Rule 412(a). The rule 
is designed to get rid of evidence in the form of propensity or character evidence. To be an exception, 
the evidence must be specific and go towards proving something more than propensity indirectly. 
 61. Chambers, 2019 WL 1891005, at *2. 
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C. Contextual Analysis of Rule 412 
Furthermore, evidence of STIs should also be admissible as a prior specific 
instance of sexual conduct under Rule 412 because STI evidence is relevant to 
the identity of the alleged perpetrator, unlike the inadmissible evidence that 
Rule 412 explicitly forbids. For example, a victim’s prior work in the sex 
industry is inadmissible as a prior specific instance under Rule 412.62 An alleged 
victim’s “mode of dress” during an encounter is similarly excluded to prove the 
alleged victim’s sexual predisposition63 as is the victim’s viewing of 
pornographic material.64 Additionally, social media page contents have been 
found inadmissible.65 Some states have excluded evidence of age-inappropriate 
sexual knowledge.66 None of these examples are relevant to the identity of the 
perpetrator of the alleged crime; rather they are simply facts that imply some 
kind of general sexual behavior, which Rule 412 has made clear is inadmissible. 
In contrast, STI evidence points to a specific sexual encounter(s) when the 
infection was transmitted from one person to another. 
STI evidence is more analogous to semen evidence than to any of the 
above-mentioned examples. Offering evidence to show that the semen found 
on the victim is the semen of someone other than the defendant creates doubt 
that the defendant committed the acts alleged.67 In the same way, if the 
defendant does not have an STI but the victim does, depending on the type of 
STI, that fact could reduce the possibility that it was the defendant who 
committed sexual violence against the victim. Both have a similar probative—
and exculpatory—effect, and semen has been routinely held admissible under 
Rule 412.68 Especially where more reliable DNA evidence is not available, STI 
evidence is particularly important to the defendant. 
 
 62. United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 63. Michael H. Graham, “Rape Shield” Statutes: Overview; Fed. R. Evid. 412; Mode of Dress, 
Statements of Sexual Nature or Intention, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 1378, 1389 (2012). 
 64. Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2000). But see State v. Rorie, 242 N.C. App. 
655, 662–63, 776 S.E.2d 338, 343–44 (2015) (holding that evidence that the defendant was “watching 
a pornographic video, without anything more, is not evidence of sexual activity barred by the Rape 
Shield Statute”). 
 65. See, e.g., In re K.W., 192 N.C. App. 646, 651, 666 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2018) (holding the contents 
of a Myspace page, including statements that the alleged victim was not a virgin and had answered a 
question affirmatively about whether she previously had sex, were not specific instances of sexual 
behavior offered for the purpose of showing that the acts were not committed by the respondent). 
 66. See, e.g., White v. State, 242 S.W.3d 240, 246–47 (Ark. 2006). 
 67. It does not eliminate the possibility altogether. For example, because semen can live in a 
person for up to a few days, if the person had consenting sex with someone else then the defendant 
could still have committed the crime later while wearing a condom. See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, 
Credibility, and the Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant’s Past Sexual Behavior, 44 
CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 729–31 (1995). 
 68. See, e.g., State v. Timothy C., 787 S.E.2d 888, 897, 899 (W. Va. 2016) (holding it was 
reversible error to exclude results from DNA tests, which showed that the semen found on clothing 
98 N.C. L. REV. 689 (2020) 
698 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
D. Judicial Interpretation of Rule 41269 
The states that have deemed STI evidence admissible under Rule 412 have 
emphasized that such evidence is valuable for the defendant, despite Rule 412’s 
concerns in protecting the victim’s sexual history from being unnecessarily 
exposed.70 These courts, however, have emphasized that STI evidence must be 
offered through expert testimony that explains how the STI is contracted 
between people.71 For example, in Reece v. State,72 the defendant wanted to 
present evidence that he did not have the same STI, trichomoniasis, that the 
complainant did have.73 The defendant planned to present this evidence 
through medical records.74 The trial court did not admit the evidence, but the 
Georgia Court of Appeals held that the defendant should have been able to 
introduce testimony about the complainant’s sexually transmitted infection and 
the defendant’s lack of infection.75 The court was clear that the STI evidence 
was “vital” to the defendant and “not an improper attempt to explore the 
victim’s past or other sexual experience.”76 Further, the court stated that even 
if the STI evidence 
under some remote consideration . . . suggests that . . . the victim had 
some sexual activity with someone else, so be it.	. . . Any possible harm 
caused to the victim by such speculation is far outweighed by the harm 
done to the defendant in denying him the opportunity to prove he did 
not have the disease.77  
 
worn by the alleged victim at the time of alleged sexual assault was not the defendant’s under rape 
shield law). 
 69. Perhaps because of the limited federal criminal jurisdiction over sexual violence crimes, there 
is a lack of federal case law interpreting whether STI evidence is a specific instance of sexual behavior 
under Rule 412. Thus far, only the Eighth Circuit has interpreted this issue, and the Supreme Court 
of the Virgin Islands has relied on the Ninth Circuit to interpret the issue. See United States v. Tail, 
459 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2006); Alexander v. Virgin Islands, 60 V.I. 486, 504 (2014) (“The 
testimony that the defense sought to elicit from Detective Thomas could arguably fall within the 
exceptions found in subsections (b)(1)(A) and (C). For instance, the source of an injury, namely an 
STD, can be a permissible purpose for admission of evidence under Rule 412, if the evidence tends to 
exclude the defendant as the source of the injury.” (citing United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 1473 
(9th Cir. 1991))). 
 70. See, e.g., Reece v. State, 383 S.E.2d 572, 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 71. See State v. Marsh, No. E1998-00057-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 555231, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. May 8, 2000) (affirming the trial court’s exclusion of STI evidence because “[i]n Fears, there was 
medical evidence introduced at trial establishing, among other things, how one might contract 
gonorrhea, [but n]othing here made the claims of the defense material to the central issue”). 
 72. 383 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 73. Id. at 573. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 574. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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In sum, courts that admit STI evidence recognize the fine balance of 
avoiding retraumatizing a victim-witness while allowing a defendant to offer 
credible evidence that goes towards proving the defendant’s innocence. Even 
though the evidence has the potential to be embarrassing to the victim, its 
exculpatory value to explain that someone other than the defendant is 
responsible for the victim’s injuries is not negated.78 As discussed further in this 
Recent Development,79 STI evidence, when tempered by evidentiary rules 
regarding expert testimony, can point to a specific sexual interaction and thus 
falls within Rule 412(b)’s exception to the general inadmissibility of evidence 
of sexual behavior. 
II.  STATE V. JACOBS AND THE CONFLICT ABOUT WHETHER STI EVIDENCE 
IS A “SPECIFIC INSTANCE” 
In 2018, North Carolina decided that STI evidence is admissible as a 
specific instance under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 412(b)(2).80 In Jacobs, 
The defendant was accused of committing sexual acts with a child.81 After the 
child reported that the defendant had been having sexual intercourse with her, 
she was taken to the hospital and examined.82 She recounted that the defendant 
had sexual intercourse with her on a number of occasions over a three-year 
period, beginning when she was eight years old and continuing until she 
reported his conduct when she was eleven.83 The examination showed that the 
alleged victim had Trichomonas vaginalis and the herpes simplex virus, while the 
defendant did not.84 At trial, the defense submitted an offer of proof that 
contained the “Medical Expert Report” prepared by an infectious disease 
specialist describing the testimony the doctor would give regarding the STI 
evidence.85 The doctor’s proffered testimony follows: “Based upon the results 
of these tests, it [was his] expert opinion that it [was] not likely that the [alleged 
victim] and defendant engaged in unprotected sexual activity over a long period 
of time without transmitting either the Trichomonas, the Herpes simplex 
 
 78. See, e.g., State v. Ollis, 318 N.C. 370, 377, 348 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1986) (holding the exclusion 
of testimonial evidence that other sexual activity could explain the victim’s injuries was reversible 
error). 
 79. See infra Part III.  
 80. N.C. R. EVID. 412; State v. Jacobs, 370 N.C. 661, 662, 811 S.E.2d 579, 580 (2018). The North 
Carolina Rule of Evidence 412 “is clearly intended” to allow the same relevant evidence as set out in 
federal Rule 412(b)(2). State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 41, 269 S.E.2d 110, 115 (1980). 
 81. Jacobs, 370 N.C. at 662, 811 S.E.2d at 580. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 663, 811 S.E.2d at 580–81. 
 84. Id. at 662, 811 S.E.2d at 580. 
 85. Id. at 663–64, 811 S.E.2d at 581. 
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infection, or both, to the defendant.”86 However, the district court did not allow 
this testimony, and the defendant was found guilty.87 
Following the view held by other states that STI evidence is inadmissible, 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision because 
it viewed that the reason for the doctor’s testimony was “to raise speculation 
and insinuate that [the complainant] must have been sexually active with 
someone else.”88 The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed, stating that 
“[t]he purpose of this evidence appears to be precisely what defendant stated it 
to be: to support his claim that he did not commit the criminal acts for which 
he was charged. That purpose aligns completely with the exception carved out 
in Rule 412(b)(2).”89 The court noted that offering medical evidence “that 
directly supports an inference ‘that the act or acts charged were not committed 
by the defendant’” is permissible.90 Additionally, the court noted that the 
defendant had offered evidence other than the STI evidence to go towards 
proving his innocence—including his own testimony.91 Therefore, the court 
held the evidence admissible and remanded for a new trial.92 Although it is true 
such evidence would suggest the alleged victim had sexual history with another 
person, the purpose of the evidence as a whole would be to exculpate the 
defendant. 
While North Carolina ultimately admitted the STI evidence, other states 
have decided differently, finding that STI evidence is inadmissible under Rule 
412 on the theory that STI evidence relates to the victim’s sexual behavior or 
alleged sexual predisposition.93 For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
 
 86. Id. at 666, 811 S.E.2d at 582. 
 87. Id. at 664, 811 S.E.2d at 581.  
 88. State v. Jacobs, 252 N.C. App. 402, 408, 798 S.E.2d 532, 536 (2017). 
 89. Jacobs, 370 N.C. at 666, 811 S.E.2d at 582–83. 
 90. Id. at 667, 811 S.E.2d at 583 (quoting N.C. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)). 
 91. Id. at 663, 811 S.E.2d at 581. 
 92. Id. at 667, 811 S.E.2d at 583. 
 93. See State v. Ozuna, 316 P.3d 109, 114 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (“We believe that the better 
approach is to recognize that evidence related to whether a victim had an STD or whether the defendant 
thought the victim had an STD at the time of an alleged sex crime is evidence of a victim’s past sexual 
behavior. Evidence that the defendant subsequently did not contract that disease would not be relevant 
without first establishing that the victim had an STD. Admissibility of such evidence is governed by 
I.R.E. 412. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by treating the STD evidence as 
evidence of past sexual behavior under I.R.E. 412.”); State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 496–97 (Iowa 
1997) (holding evidence that victim tested positive for gonorrhea shortly after a sexual assault as 
evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior under Iowa Rule of Evidence 412); State v. Cunningham, 
995 P.2d 561, 568 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (holding evidence of an STI is tantamount to evidence of past 
sexual behavior under Oregon Rule of Evidence 412 because STIs generally occur as the result of sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact); Smith v. State, 737 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987) (analyzing 
proffered evidence that the victim had gonorrhea on date of rape examination as evidence of the 
victim’s previous sexual conduct under Texas rape shield law); State v. Jarry, 641 A.2d 364, 366 (Vt. 
1994) (allowing evidence that the victim had chlamydia on the date of the rape examination as the 
victim’s prior sexual conduct under Vermont’s rape shield law). 
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excluded the evidence because of the public’s prejudicial perception of STIs.94 
In contrast to courts that have admitted STI evidence, other courts seem 
concerned that evidence of a victim’s STI is either not probative enough to 
show the defendant’s innocence or is too inflammatory, resulting in the jury 
overvaluing the evidence.95 This is somewhat unsurprising, as a majority of 
modern rape shield laws “tend to the opposite extreme of the old rule of 
automatic admissibility: presumptive inadmissibility.”96 
Public perception of STIs is one of willful blindness. Though perhaps 
avoided in casual conversation, studies indicate the public thinks STI education 
should be discussed more.97 Perhaps, too, courts are fearful of returning to the 
days before the enactment of rape shield laws when victims were interrogated 
about every facet of their sexual history.98 Because of this, judges may also 
believe that STI evidence will cause juries to form negative opinions about the 
party who has the STI rather than regarding the evidence’s probative value.99 
Courts that have found STI evidence inadmissible are overly concerned 
with the fear that STI evidence is only offered to show that the victim is 
promiscuous.100 First, the evidence the defendant offers is not always that the 
victim has an STI; it could also be the case that the defendant has an STI that 
the victim does not. Offering evidence that the alleged victim lacks an STI 
cannot reasonably be said to be “evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged 
in other sexual behavior”101 or “evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual 
predisposition.”102 Second, judges have the discretion to determine—and 
defense lawyers have the obligation to show—that the STI evidence is being 
 
 94. See Fells v. State, 207 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Ark. 2005) (holding that evidence of victim’s HIV-
positive status fell under the state’s rape shield law as evidence of prior sexual conduct because of the 
public’s general perception of it as an STI). 
 95. See, e.g., Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d at 497 (holding that the STI evidence had “low probative value 
because it can’t be established with reasonable clarity that the victim had the STD at the time of the 
alleged contact”). 
 96. J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth 
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 551 (1980).  
 97. Rosalind Thomas et al., Community Attitudes About Discussing Sexual Health: Assessing Public 
Opinion of Local STD Prevention Campaigns, 128 PUB. HEALTH REP. (SUPPLEMENT I) 73, 79 (2013). 
 98. See Capers, supra note 12, at 835 (“[T]he common law allowed defendants to cross-examine a 
complainant about her sexual history, to introduce testimony regarding the complainant’s reputation 
for chastity, and in some cases, even to call a complainant’s prior sexual partners as witnesses.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Fells, 207 S.W.3d at 502 (holding that evidence of the victim’s HIV-positive status 
fell under the state’s rape shield law as evidence of prior sexual conduct because of the public’s general 
perception of it as an STI). 
 100. See State v. Ozuna, 316 P.3d 109, 116 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (“The district court also noted 
the presence of other legitimate interests—namely, the danger of embarrassing the victim and giving 
the jury the impression that she was promiscuous.”); Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d at 496–97, 499 (“There was 
just too much danger that the omitted STD evidence would brand [the victim] as promiscuous in the 
eyes of the jury and for that reason not worthy of belief.”). 
 101. FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1). 
 102. FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(2). 
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offered to prove something other than propensity for sexual behavior. If the 
judge determines the STI evidence is going to disprove an element of the 
charged crime, the evidence is probative and should be admitted. 
III.  WHY STI EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE SPECIFIC 
INSTANCE EXCEPTION TO RULE 412 
This Recent Development argues that STI evidence should be admissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and comparable state rape shield laws as a 
specific instance of sexual behavior. This part examines two reasons why it is 
critical STI evidence be deemed admissible under Rule 412. First, defendants 
accused of sexual violence face uniquely burdensome hurdles in the course of 
trial as compared to defendants charged with other crimes. Second, even if the 
critiques of admitting STI evidence are true, evidentiary rules governing expert 
testimony and prejudicial testimony ensure that only STI evidence that is 
relevant and probative would be admissible. 
A. Hurdles 
Criminal defendants accused of sexual assault or abuse face incredible 
obstacles in the criminal justice system due to widespread bias.103 Excluding STI 
evidence is problematic because it makes it more difficult for defendants in 
these cases to construct and present a defense to the specific charge. Although, 
historically, alleged victims were met with disbelief, some are concerned that 
the pendulum is swinging too far in the opposite direction: “[o]ur social and 
judicial reactions have shifted from widespread disbelief of any victim to an 
immediate reflexive belief of every victim.”104 Bias against a defendant solely 
because he is accused of sexual assault, particularly sexual assault of a child, 
increases the importance of the right to introduce objective, exculpatory 
evidence.105 The public often reacts to cases involving sexual assault—
particularly those with a child victim—with horror, nausea, and outrage.106 And 
 
 103. See Neil Vidmar, Generic Prejudice and the Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials, 21 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 5, 5–8 (1997). 
 104. Laurie Shanks, Child Sexual Abuse: Moving Toward a Balanced and Rational Approach to the 
Cases Everyone Abhors, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 517, 520 (2011). Although Professor Shanks is likely 
overstating the response to those reporting to be victims of sexual violence, it should be noted that 
public response is not as victim-centric as she posits. See, e.g., Laura E. Gómez, Use Your Personal Lie 
Detector to Judge Kavanaugh, 26 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 33 (2019) (discussing the many people, 
including women, who defended Justice Kavanaugh when Dr. Christine Blasey Ford came forward 
with sexual assault accusations); see also Rachel Donadio, Vatican Preparing New Guidelines To Deal with 
Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at A5 (discussing the ways the Catholic Church has handled 
abuse internally, which favors the accused instead of the victim, rather than outsourcing). 
 105. Brief of North Carolina Advocates for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant at 8–
9, State v. Jacobs, 370 N.C. 661, 811 S.E.2d 579 (2018) (No. 126PA17) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus 
Curiae] (citing Vidmar, supra note 103, at 5–8). 
 106. Shanks, supra note 104, at 519. 
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although Rule 412 was enacted in part to ensure that the alleged victim’s and 
defendant’s rights were “fairly balance[d],” criminal defendants in these cases 
face a steep uphill battle to be treated as innocent until proven guilty.107 
Research demonstrates the difficulty of providing fair trials for those 
accused of sexual assaults and child sex crimes.108 First, jurors are influenced by 
a wide variety of factors in sexual violence trials, including a defendant’s 
socioeconomic status, physical appearance, and relationship status.109 Studies 
conducted on juror bias towards defendants accused of sexual violence indicate 
a general empathy towards rape victims and a general attitude of prejudgment 
of the accused as guilty.110 Victims or people who know victims of sexual 
violence are unsurprisingly more likely to have these views.111 The research also 
indicates that the lack of impartiality in jurors comes not as much from 
detestation of sexual violence, but rather “attitudes and beliefs that bear on the 
presumption of innocence.”112 One juror from a sexual abuse trial, when 
questioned on voir dire about his duty to impartiality, remarked, “I guess in 
certain situations I consider people are guilty until proven innocent; I know it’s 
not the way it is suppose [sic] to be, but that’s the way it is sometimes.”113 This 
juror’s comment exemplifies the attitudes generally formed by jurors upon 
hearing the nature of the charges against a defendant accused of sexual violence. 
The public’s negative perception of those accused of sexual assault creates a 
barrier to ensuring that a defendant’s constitutional rights are protected “and 
that only the truly guilty are convicted.”114 
Disdain for sexual abuse offenders is not limited to the community at 
large—even attorneys react with repugnance to these cases. When lawyers were 
surveyed as to whether or not “people accused of child sexual abuse should be 
entitled to the same legal protections as defendants accused of other crimes,” 
twenty-five percent of lawyers believed that such individuals did not deserve 
the same rights as other criminal defendants.115 Even judges—officials charged 
to be impartial—face public pressure and struggle to find the appropriate course 
of action to handle sex crimes.116 A judge presiding over a sexual assault trial can 
 
 107. 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). 
 108. Vidmar, supra note 103, at 5–8. 
 109. See Claire Gravelin, Monica Biernat & Caroline E. Bucher, Blaming the Victim of Acquaintance 
Rape: Individual, Situational, and Sociocultural Factors, 9 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 10–12 (2019). 
 110. Vidmar, supra note 103, at 7 (citing five studies); see David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape 
in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1275 (1997). 
 111. Vidmar, supra note 103 at 7. 
 112. Id. at 18. 
 113. Id. at 7. 
 114. Shanks, supra note 104, at 519. 
 115. Stephen L. Carter, What Is the Source of the Obligation of Public Service for the Professions?, 25 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 103, 115 (1999). 
 116. See Phylis Skloot Bamberger & Richard N. Allman, Some Special Concerns in the Trial of Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases, 64 N.Y. ST. B.J. 18, 18 (1992); Ronnie Hall, In the Shadowlands: Fisher and the 
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be thrust into the limelight, exposing himself or herself to vicious backlash if 
the outcome is viewed unfavorably by the public.117 This is particularly 
concerning for judges who are elected rather than appointed.118 Empirical 
evidence suggests that judicial campaign donations affect judicial 
decisionmaking.119 For instance, campaign contributions from the public in 
partisan judicial elections are positively correlated with donor-friendly judicial 
outcomes.120 It is not unreasonable, then, to infer that other public pressures 
similarly affect judges presiding over sexual assault cases. 
A recent example of the public pressure judges face when presiding over 
sexual assault trials comes from New Jersey.121 During the sentencing phase, the 
judge commented that he would recommend leniency for the defendant because 
the boy was from a “good family,” which prompted outcry from victims’ rights 
advocates.122 Shortly after the comments were published by the media, many 
members of the public called for the judge’s resignation and even disbarment.123 
The judge eventually resigned, and the New Jersey Supreme Court responded 
to the nationwide backlash by announcing mandatory training for New Jersey 
state judges on sexual assault cases.124 This example highlights the public 
pressure elected judges face.125 In light of this pressure, it is not difficult to 
imagine the public’s perception of those accused of sexual violence influencing 
a judge’s decisions during trial.126 
 
Outpatient Civil Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators” in Texas, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 175, 
180 (2006). 
 117. See Recent Election, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1369, 1371 (2019) (discussing a recall election 
initiated in 2018 for Judge Aaron Persky after his sentencing decision in the 2016 case People v. Turner, 
No. B1577162 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2016)). 
 118. See Thomas E. McClure, Do Judicial Elections Impact the Perception of Impartiality? A Comparison 
of Bar Poll Ratings of Elected and Appointed Illinois Downstate and Collar County Trial Judges, 37 JUST. SYS. 
J. 157, 158 (2016) (demonstrating that judges had lower impartiality ratings when elected rather than 
appointed based on an eighteen-year study in Illinois).  
 119. Aviva Abramovsky, Justice for Sale: Contemplations on the “Impartial” Judge in a Citizens United 
World, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 713, 716. 
 120. Id. at 727–28. 
 121. See Luis Ferré-Sadurní & Nick Corasaniti, Rape Case Judge Resigns Over ‘Good Family’ Remark; 
State Orders Training, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/nyregion/
judge-james-troiano-resigning.html [https://perma.cc/U8A9-GGXC (dark archive)]. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Judicial elections at the state level are common. See Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 8, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/judicial-selection-significant-figures [https://perma.cc/HTS2-2TXB] (noting thirty-nine 
states use “some form of election” for judges). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that many judges in 
sexual violence crime trials are subject to some level of public pressure in the face of elections.  
 126. See Shanks, supra note 104, at 519–20 n.4 (noting this phenomenon in the child sexual abuse 
context). 
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Despite a prosecutor’s personal feelings towards a defendant charged with 
sexual abuse, he or she has an ethical obligation “to ensure that justice is done 
in each case” not just to secure a conviction.127 But with child sexual assault cases 
in particular, prosecutors may prioritize a conviction instead of the defendant’s 
rights or convicting the correct person for the sake of the victim and the 
prosecutor’s constituents.128 Furthermore, for these types of cases, defense 
attorneys face significant restrictions in the discovery process, such as the right 
of the victim to decline an interview by defense counsel.129 Perhaps most 
concerning in light of the discretion police officers have over the investigative 
process, they have been found to “disregard their training and make arrests 
based exclusively on the words of the [alleged victim]” without corroboration.130 
Therefore, any other relevant exculpatory evidence the defendant can present—
such as STI evidence—is crucial. 
Moreover, much is at stake for defendants accused of sexually violent 
crimes by way of the many potential punishments to be levied in the event of a 
guilty verdict. These potential lifelong punishments include prison time, a 
stripping of rights, sexual offender registration, and probation.131 For example, 
in North Carolina, defendants in sexual assault cases “will face some of the 
longest punishments and most extensive post-release restrictions” if found 
guilty as compared to other crimes.132 The way the American criminal justice 
system punishes sexual violence crimes evinces how negatively we view those 
accused of these crimes. The lengthy prison sentences add to the injustices 
because of the number of wrongfully convicted defendants,133 including those 
originally accused of sex offenses. Between 1989 and February 2017, 1994 
defendants—including individuals originally convicted of child sex abuse—
were exonerated in the United States after being wrongfully convicted.134 
Though there are relatively few deliberately false accusations of sexual abuse, 
 
 127. Id. at 521 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010)). 
 128. Id. at 522–23. 
 129. Id. at 524. 
 130. Id. at 527. 
 131. See Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual Violence or Recidivism, 
100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412, 413 (2010). 
 132. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 105, at 9 (first citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.5 to .45 
(2017) (detailing sex offender registration and satellite-based monitoring programs); and then N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (2017) (providing sentencing chart)). 
 133. See, e.g., The National Registry of Exonerations: Patrick McAllister, U. MICH. (May 17, 2018), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5326 
[https://perma.cc/FQ2P-3MB6] (illustrating how the use of STI evidence on appeal demonstrated the 
victim had lesions from an STI and "not from being raped," exonerating the defendant after six years 
in prison). 
 134. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016, at 3, 5–6 (2017). 
Furthermore, from 1989 through 2013, at least 154 of the individuals exonerated were originally 
convicted of child sex abuse. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2013, at 11 
(2013). 
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they do occur.135 Thus, although “[e]very effort must be made to improve the 
legal system’s ability to protect [victims] and punish offenders[,] . . . great care 
must be taken to safeguard the innocent against false accusation.”136 
As evidenced by widespread movements against sexual assault and sexual 
harassment like the #MeToo movement,137 our society cares about protecting 
people who have been sexually abused or harassed. Rule 412 aims to limit, to 
the extent possible, the revictimization of a person who has already suffered 
from such a personal and traumatic event. However, those charged with sexual 
assault are also vulnerable: they face lengthy prison sentences and a long-lasting 
stigma that will follow them for the rest of their lives.138 But research has shown 
that these laws actually encourage recidivism.139 The resulting stigmatization 
under sex offender registration and notification laws “is likely to result in . . . 
loss of or difficulties finding jobs, difficulties finding housing, and decreased 
psychological well-being, all factors that could increase [offenders’] risk of 
recidivism.”140 Because of the permanent consequences following a sexual 
violence crime conviction, it is crucial to due process that defendants should be 
allowed to present certain types of relevant, exculpatory evidence, such as 
evidence that the alleged victim possesses an STI that the defendant does not. 
As an extension of a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, courts 
should admit STI evidence when it is offered through proper expert testimony. 
B. Evidentiary Safeguards 
Opponents of admitting STI evidence under Rule 412 are right to be 
concerned about the potential harm to alleged victims. However, critics forget 
that Rule 412 is not the only gatekeeper of this type of evidence—both Daubert 
and Federal Rule of Evidence 403 act as barriers to scientifically unreliable or 
too prejudicial evidence. These serve as evidentiary barriers to keep out 
 
 135. For a review of the small body of research on false accusations, see JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS 
ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER ABUSE CASES § 6.05 (3d ed. 2005). False reporting 
of sexual assaults remains very rare, between two and ten percent. David Lisak et al., False Allegations 
of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1330 
(2010). 
 136. John E.B. Myers, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation: Consensus and Confusion, 14 
U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2010). 
 137. See About, supra note 5. 
 138. For example, in response to the “community-wide hysteria” following the realization that a 
sex offender reside[d] in their neighborhood, parents in New York “reacted by posting signs warning 
that ‘Monsters Live Here.’” Bonnar-Kidd, supra note 131, at 415. This hysteria “led to a proliferation 
of registered sex offender laws above and beyond community notification.	. . . [I]n 2008, Governor 
Bobby Jindal signed SB 144, a bill making chemical castration . . . mandatory for certain offenders. In 
other states, registered sex offenders are subject to civil commitment.” Id. 
 139. Id. at 412. 
 140. Hollida Wakefield, The Vilification of Sex Offenders: Do Laws Targeting Sex Offenders Increase 
Recidivism and Sexual Violence?, 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT 141, 141 (2006). 
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unreliable scientific evidence concerning STIs as well as extremely 
inflammatory evidence. 
First, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.141 and Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 together act as a block to unreliable scientific evidence.142 Daubert 
established that scientific evidence must satisfy a reliability test that “entails a 
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying 
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”143 In most states, the 
corresponding rule of evidence to Rule 702 “impose[s] a requirement that 
judges admit expert testimony only if it is based on a scientifically sound 
foundation.”144 Daubert and other related evidentiary principles designed to 
ensure the reliability of expert evidence are already regularly applied in sexual 
abuse cases.145 In the context of medical testimony concerning the significance 
of a victim having STIs while the defendant does not, medical expert testimony 
is valuable as it aids the jury in understanding rates of infection and 
transmission. Additionally, research shows that certain sexually transmitted 
infections indicate sexual abuse while others do not.146 This is particularly true 
“in prepubertal children.”147 Daubert was created to prohibit the “junk science” 
that was traditionally admissible in courts;148 it would function similarly to 
 
 141. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 142. FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 at 592–93. Rule 702 provides: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 143. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. 
 144. David W. Barnes, General Acceptance Versus Scientific Soundness: Mad Scientists in the Courtroom, 
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 303, 303 (2004). 
 145. See United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2008) (“In child sexual abuse cases, ‘a 
qualified expert can inform the jury of characteristics in sexually abused children and describe the 
characteristics the alleged victim exhibits.’ An expert can also summarize the medical evidence and 
express an opinion that the evidence is consistent or inconsistent with the victim’s allegations of sexual 
abuse.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2001))). 
 146. See Myers, supra note 136, at 10–11, 13 (listing different STIs that either “raise suspicion” or 
“are persuasive” of unwanted sexual contact in child sexual abuse cases). 
 147. Id. at 10. 
 148. See Kenneth R. Berman, Daubert Turning 20: Junk Science Replaced by Junk Rulings?, A.B.A. 
SEC. LITIG. (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation
/materials/sac_2012/18-2_daubert_turning.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY8Y-JMEF]. 
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exclude faulty evidence concerning the significance of STI evidence in sexual 
abuse or assault cases. 
Additionally, the origin of an STI can have similar probative value as that 
of the origin of sperm.149 And like the origin of sperm, the origin of a sexually 
transmitted infection requires expert testimony.150 For STIs, an expert is 
needed to testify about 
the incubation period of a disease; the potential mode of transmission, 
including whether the acts alleged were potential or exclusive means of 
transmission; the rate of transmission from male to female, female to 
male, or between people of the same gender; the availability of 
treatment, or if there is no cure; the effectiveness of any treatment; the 
time after treatment when a person might test as negative; how testing 
is done; how testing is interpreted; and whether the presence or absence 
of the disease in the complaining witness and defendant is consistent 
with the State’s theory of the case.151 
Rates of infection of STIs vary depending on the type of sex and whether 
the sex was unprotected.152 Gonorrhea, chlamydia, human papillomavirus 
(“HPV”), human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), herpes, and syphilis are all 
easily passed through vaginal or anal sex without a condom.153 When a condom 
is used during sex, HPV, herpes, and syphilis can still be passed to a sexual 
partner; however, gonorrhea, chlamydia, and HIV are not commonly passed.154 
These STIs are not passed—or not commonly passed—through oral sex with a 
condom or barrier, and HIV in particular is difficult to transfer through oral 
sex.155 When there is a low likelihood that an STI was passed between the 
defendant and the alleged victim, evidence of the STI has little probative value. 
Daubert and Rule 702 would prevent expert testimony of STI evidence for an 
STI that is not as likely to be contracted through a singular sexual encounter or 
an STI that is rarely contracted even over multiple encounters. 
For example, in Jacobs, the medical expert’s proffered testimony stated the 
reason that both the defendant and alleged victim would have the STI if they 
 
 149. See Myers, supra note 136, at 7–9 (noting that experts could testify in child abuse trials that 
the “presence of spermatozoa” is “powerful evidence of sexual contact” and also could testify as to the 
duration and detectability of sperm). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 105, at 5–6. 
 152. STD Risk and Oral Sex – CDC Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/std/healthcomm/stdfact-stdriskandoralsex.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4G9-9GRB]. 
Most sexual assaults occur without the use of a condom. See Eryn Nicole O’Neal et al., Condom Use 
During Sexual Assault, 20 J. FORENSIC & LEGAL MED. 605, 606 (2013). 
 153. STD Risk and Oral Sex – CDC Fact Sheet, supra note 152. 
 154. Id. 
 155. HIV Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/transmission.html [https://perma.cc/A3LD-S9TL]. 
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had sexual contact with the victim was due to the alleged victim’s statements 
that the sexual abuse occurred over a period of years.156 If a defendant wants to 
put forth evidence that an alleged victim had an STI that is less likely to be 
contracted during a single sexual encounter—for example, HIV—and the facts 
alleged were of one sexual encounter, then Daubert and Rule 702 would prevent 
this evidence from being admissible. Thus, critics of admitting STI evidence 
should not be concerned that STI evidence not backed by scientific reliability 
will be admitted under Rule 412. Daubert and Rule 702 will act as gatekeepers 
to unreliable evidence concerning the origin and transmission of an STI. The 
presentation of STI evidence by experts or through medical records limits the 
possibility a defendant may simply humiliate an alleged victim, reflecting 
courts’ ongoing concern to protect potential victims. States that do not 
currently allow this evidence ignore that there is more than one rule of evidence 
to evaluate the admissibility of STI evidence. 
In addition to Daubert, Federal Rule of Evidence 403157 serves as a barrier 
to prejudicial evidence of a victim’s sexual history or proclivities. It is 
conceivable that, in certain circumstances, evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior 
may be so inflammatory that it outweighs any probative value.158 For instance, 
in United States v. Pumpkin Seed,159 the district court prevented the defendant 
charged with aggravated sexual abuse from presenting evidence that the alleged 
victim engaged in consensual sexual activity with other men within days of the 
alleged abuse.160 On appeal, the defendant claimed that this was erroneous 
because it would have helped prove that the victim’s injuries could have come 
from those acts.161 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the type and 
extent of injuries suffered by the victim were generally inconsistent with 
consensual activity, so the evidence would have a high risk of unfair prejudice 
and confusion.162 Indeed, Rule 403 is one of the most important discretionary 
tools a trial judge possesses.163 Even if evidence of the alleged victim’s STIs 
 
 156. See State v. Jacobs, 370 N.C. 661, 666, 811 S.E.2d 579, 582 (2018). 
 157. Rule 403 states that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 
FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 158. JENNIFER A. BROBST, ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN NORTH CAROLINA § 8:10 (2018) 
(“Regardless of whether the history of a victim witness’s sexual behavior should be excluded under 
Rule 412, the trial court may exclude the same evidence under Rule 403. The rape shield rule ‘was not 
meant to be the sole gauge for determining whether evidence is admissible in rape cases.’” (quoting 
State v. West, 255 N.C. App. 162, 166, 804 S.E.2d 225, 227 (2017))). 
 159. 572 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 160. Id. at 557. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 558. 
 163. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 403.02-1 to -2, Lexis (database updated Mar. 2020). 
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would be admissible under Rule 412(b), the trial judge may think the jurors 
might overvalue the evidence and thus exclude it.164  
State courts may be following suit. At least one state has found that, while 
STI evidence technically might be admissible in a particular case, the evidence 
there was too inflammatory to be admissible.165 Rule 403 responds to the 
concerns of commentators that any evidence of prior sexual activity creates a 
substantial prejudicial effect.166 Because Rule 403 would keep out any 
substantially prejudicial evidence related to the victim’s sexual history, allowing 
STI evidence in a specific instance will not unduly harm a victim’s privacy or 
reputational interests. 
Further, judges should take care not to discount the probative value of STI 
evidence. Like the facts of Jacobs, in cases where the alleged victim reports 
repeated sexual assaults over a period of time, the likelihood that an STI would 
transfer between the parties increases as compared to an isolated incident of 
sexual assault. Thus, the period of time of the alleged sexual assault(s) can 
increase STI evidence’s probative value. 
Additionally, STI evidence is particularly probative in cases where the 
complainant is a child. Because prepubescent children are far less likely to be 
sexually active, STI evidence would not influence a jury to view a child 
complainant as morally suspect for being sexually active like a jury may be more 
likely to do with an adult complainant or even a teenager.167 With child 
complainants, it may be more apparent that the child has been victimized 
because of the child’s low likelihood of engagement in other sexual activity. 
Thus, STI evidence can shed light on who victimized the child without affecting 
the jury’s perception of the complainant.168 
Rule 412 is not the only barrier to admissibility of STI evidence in sexual 
abuse and assault cases. The requirements that the evidence be scientifically 
reliable and not substantially more prejudicial than probative ensure that only 
probative evidence concerning the presence or absence of an STI is admissible 
 
 164. Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 227 (1976). 
 165. See State v. Ervin, 723 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding exclusion of 
testimony that the victim had gonorrhea under the state’s rape shield law because of its inflammatory 
and prejudicial impact). 
 166. See Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1977). 
 167. Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 
2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/american-teens-sexual-and-reproductive-health 
[https://perma.cc/9476-HVC2] (depicting that nearly zero percent of ten-year-old children are sexually 
active while twenty percent of fifteen-year-olds and sixty-five percent of eighteen-year-olds are 
sexually active). 
 168. In cases where a child was victimized by multiple people, a medical expert may likely conclude 
that she cannot ascertain the likelihood of STI transmission as accurately as she could if there was only 
one defendant; in these cases, Rule 702 could prevent STI evidence from being admitted because of 
the lack of exculpatory value of the evidence.  
98 N.C. L. REV. 689 (2020) 
2020] STI EVIDENCE AND RAPE SHIELD LAWS 711 
at trial. Especially in light of the perception of criminal defendants in these 
types of cases and the many procedural obstacles they face in court, these 
defendants should be able to present evidence to prove they were not the source 
of the alleged victim’s injuries. Thus, admitting STI evidence under Rule 412 
is proper because the evidence is not offered to show the victim’s propensity for 
sexual activity, but rather as part of a defendant’s defense as to why he was not 
the perpetrator of the alleged crime. Further, the format of the presentation of 
that evidence by experts or through medical records limits the possibility a 
defendant may humiliate a complainant, which promotes courts’ attempts to 
protect potential victims. 
IV.  RESPONDING TO CRITICISMS OF ADMITTING STI EVIDENCE 
States have not treated STI evidence uniformly in sexual violence cases.169 
Courts that have decided STI evidence is inadmissible label it as evidence of 
the victim’s previous sexual behavior,170 meaning STI evidence is not specific 
enough to qualify for the exception under Rule 412. Relatedly, critics are also 
concerned about the embarrassment that admission of STI evidence would 
create for the alleged victim. This part first responds to criticism that STI 
evidence is not a specific instance. Next, it shows why STI evidence does not 
cause the embarrassment for victims that Rule 412 intended to eliminate from 
sexual violence trials. 
A. Why STI Evidence Is More than Propensity Evidence 
Rule 412 is intended to prevent the admission of general propensity 
evidence—evidence that the alleged victim has the propensity for certain sexual 
behaviors. Rule 412 has resulted in the exclusion of the following evidence at 
trial: (1) an alleged victim’s “general reputation in and around the Army post”; 
(2) a victim’s “habit of calling out to the barracks to speak to various and sundry 
soldiers”; (3) a victim’s “habit of coming to the post to meet people and of her 
habit for being at the barracks at the snack bar”; (4) evidence from an alleged 
victim’s former landlord regarding his experience with her promiscuity; and (5) 
a social worker’s opinion of an alleged victim.171 Thus, the rule aims to exclude 
“sexual stereotyping,” for example, that the alleged victim is promiscuous.172 
 
 169. Compare State v. Jacobs, 370 N.C. 661, 667, 811 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2018) (determining that STI 
evidence falls within the exception of Rule 412(b)(1) in first-degree sex offense case), with State v. 
Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 497, 499 (Iowa 1997) (concluding that district court did not violate the 
defendant’s “Sixth Amendment rights [by] excluding STD evidence” because of its low probative value 
and risk to be highly inflammatory). 
 170. See State v. Cunningham, 995 P.2d 561, 568 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). 
 171. Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 47 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 172. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment; supra Section I.A. 
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Critics of admitting STI evidence under Rule 412 maintain that this 
evidence is not specific enough to be admissible under the “specific instance” 
exception to Rule 412. For example, in State v. Jacobs, Justice Morgan advocated 
in his dissent that the rule’s requirement of “specific instances of sexual 
behavior” meant that any evidence under this exception should provide “a time, 
place, or circumstance in which a complainant was involved in ‘specific instances 
of sexual behavior’” rather than submitting a medical expert’s report referencing 
the complainant’s diagnosis.173 However, by requiring a “time, place, or 
circumstance,” Justice Morgan’s textual analysis inserts more language into the 
definition of “specific” than what is required under the rule.174 
The proponents of Rule 412 did not contemplate requiring the specificity 
that Justice Morgan would have promoted.175 During discussion surrounding 
the passage of Rule 412, one representative noted that evidence of the victim’s 
past sexual relations with others could be used when the defendant offers the 
evidence to rebut he caused certain physical injuries to the victim.176 Nowhere 
in the records of debate during the enactment of Rule 412 was there any 
discussion of requiring a time, place, or circumstance with regard to the 
evidence proffered.177 
Rule 412(b) requires two things: (1) the evidence must be a “specific 
instance”; and (2) the evidence must go towards proving “that someone other 
than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical 
evidence.”178 STI evidence is “specific” because an STI is transmitted at a 
specific time (or several times) during sexual intercourse.179 Further, when 
either the defendant or the victim has the STI and the other does not, STI 
evidence goes towards proving that someone other than the defendant 
committed the acts alleged. 
Additionally, critics of admitting STI evidence argue that STI evidence is 
different than semen—which is enumerated as a “specific instance”180—because 
sperm contains genetic identification.181 But genetic proof is not required by 
Rule 412. The purpose of offering semen evidence is exculpatory: to show that 
the semen belongs to someone other than the defendant, which usually is 
accomplished through DNA testing. The same exculpatory purpose exists for 
STI evidence. STI evidence can be exculpatory not because of DNA, but 
because the presence of certain STIs in only the complainant or the defendant 
 
 173. Jacobs, 370 N.C. at 669, 811 S.E.2d at 585 (Morgan, J., dissenting). 
 174. See supra Section I.B. 
 175. See 124 CONG. REC. 34,912 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). 
 176. Id. at 34,913 (statement of Rep. Holtzman). 
 177. See id. at 34,912. 
 178. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A). 
 179. See supra Section I.B. 
 180. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A). 
 181. Myers, supra note 136, at 9. 
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may indicate that the two have not had sex. Granted, it is likely that semen 
evidence would be admissible more often than STI evidence because of the 
genetic markers in sperm. However, Jacobs carved a path where STI evidence 
can create a sufficient nexus to the identity of a person, especially when the 
complainant alleges the sexual violence was not limited to one isolated 
encounter and occurred multiple times over an extended period.182 
B. STI Evidence Will Not Revictimize the Alleged Victim 
When Congress passed Rule 412, discussion centered on the idea that 
“victims of rape are humiliated and harassed when they report . . . the rape. 
Bullied and cross-examined about their prior sexual experiences, many find the 
trial almost as degrading as the rape itself.”183 Victims have described the 
experience of testifying at trial as being “raped all over again.”184 Victims’ rights 
advocates are concerned—and rightfully so—about the jury blaming the victim 
and believing rape myths if confronted with evidence linked to the victim’s 
sexual conduct.185 
Critics of admitting STI evidence are concerned that admitting STI 
evidence will continue to revictimize the victim when she is cross-examined at 
trial.186 And states that have found STI evidence inadmissible emphasize the 
revictimization of the alleged victim when her sexual history is exposed. 
Although the introduction of evidence that the alleged victim has an STI 
that the defendant does not could conceivably cause embarrassment for the 
victim, it is not the same type of embarrassment the rule was enacted to remove 
from the courtroom.187 With STI evidence, “[t]he issue is not whether evidence 
is prejudicial in the sense that it is detrimental to someone involved in the trial. 
Rather, the question is whether the evidence will arouse the jury’s emotions of 
prejudice, hostility, or sympathy.”188 Rule 412 is concerned about evidence such 
as “mode of dress, speech, or lifestyle” that prosecutors bring out on cross-
examination as a way to humiliate and harass complainants of sexual assault.189 
 
 182. State v. Jacobs, 370 N.C. 661, 667, 811 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2018). 
 183. 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). 
 184. Amelia Gentleman, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: ‘Raped All Over Again’, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/apr/13/rape-sexual-assault-frances-andrade-court 
[https://perma.cc/VP35-9PDB]. 
 185. Peter M. Hazelton, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Limits on Zealous Advocacy, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
35, 43 (1991). 
 186. Jane E. Brody, The Twice-Victimized of Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), 
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[https://perma.cc/KW6A-QB6S (dark archive)]. 
 187. See H. Hunter Bruton, Cross-Examination, College Sexual-Assault Adjudications, and the 
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177 (2017). 
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But STI evidence is a narrow type of evidence that accomplishes more than 
establishing propensity—STI evidence, when properly admitted through 
qualified expert testimony, goes towards establishing that someone other than 
the defendant committed the acts alleged. 
The overwhelming problem with categorically excluding STI evidence is 
that rape shield laws have already severely limited a defendant’s ability to put 
forth a defense. Besides conflicting with the historical purpose of Rule 412, the 
primary consequence is that the exclusion of STI evidence infringes upon the 
constitutional right to present a defense and confront an accuser190 through 
relevant exculpatory medical evidence. As mentioned, evidence that a victim 
has an STI is likely to create some embarrassment for the alleged victim and 
may affect the jury’s opinion of her. But “the risk of a jury decision based on 
distrust or dislike of a complaining witness operates in every case where a 
victim’s testimony is important in the State’s case.”191 Rape and sexual assault 
cases are not unique in this regard.192 Research suggests jurors often 
“inadequately evaluate the testimony” of witnesses.193 When a judge is 
determining whether evidence should be admissible, the type of crime charged 
should not influence the decision.194 Thus, the constitutional question is who 
should be “prejudiced”: the defendant, “who should have paramount Sixth-
Amendment rights over a mere witness,”195 or the victim, who serves as a 
witness in a criminal trial. The “[a]dverse psychological effects” experienced by 
alleged victims in these cases are not to be diminished; however, they “are not 
grounds for excluding probative evidence.”196 
CONCLUSION 
One of the core purposes of Rule 412 is to protect victims of sexual assault 
and abuse from further humiliation. However, this protection cannot come at 
the expense of criminal defendants’ constitutional rights—namely due process 
and the right to present a defense. STI evidence should be admissible as a 
specific instance under Rule 412 and analogous state rape shield laws, especially 
because defendants in this area of the law are already subject to more hurdles in 
the criminal justice system than other criminal defendants. Other evidentiary 
barriers that prevent unreliable or overly prejudicial evidence from being 
admitted, paired with policy considerations, heavily favor admission. Thus, the 
 
 190. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988) (per curiam). 
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admission of STI evidence as a specific instance of prior sexual behavior aligns 
with the purpose of Rule 412 and helps maintain the constitutionally guaranteed 
standard of “innocent until proven guilty,”197 even for our most unforgivable 




 197. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV; Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452 (1895). 
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